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Reason and its bodyguard of general notions is now the conservative, mind-enslaving factor. Experience is the liberating power.'

I

HAD RECENTLY BEEN LOOKING into what I termed the "academic rhetoric" in legal tests, that is, in the sense of elements discerned from precedent. It appears that over time,judges had lessened
their reliance on case law precedent and increasingly relied on academic sources. As I explored the proposition (which may or may not
be true), I was waylaid by the interesting early days of formal legal
education in the United States. I noticed that at the end of the nineteenth century, legal education moved from the practical to the academic. With that transformation, the prestige of a law degree was then
purchased with an education that failed to actually train students how
to be lawyers. I conclude that we are still paying a price for the
prejudices of the past.
I.

Early Years

In the early 1800s, lawyers trained lawyers through forms of clerkships. 2 Such law schools, as there were, grew out of those law offices
and were staffed by practicing lawyers.3 The law schools were not generally affiliated with universities.
Then the law schools took over the trade, or vocational institutions, and either supplemented or substituted the old "on the job"
training with a new academic approach. By 1870, the preface to Blackstone's Commentaries noted the increasing number of lawyers coming
4
to the bar by way of law schools.
*
1.
2.

Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco.
JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 93 (Beacon Press 1968) (1920).
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO

THE 1980s 24 (1983).
3. Gene R. Shreve, History of Legal Education, 97 HARV. L. REV. 597, 598-99 (1983)
(reviewing STEVENS supra, note 2).
4. Thomas M. Cooley, Preface to 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND xxvii (4th ed. Chicago, Callaghan and Co., 1899).
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The "crucial period in the development of legal education [was]
the last third of the nineteenth century." 5 Dean Langdell at Harvard

Law School was the emblematic re-inventor of the law school: he
urged a view of legal education as a purveyor of "science," as opposed
to a "species of handicraft" unsuitable for association with the great
universities. 6 As a scientific and academic institution, the new law
school's three-year, Socratic method, formalized approach was touted
as the only way towards a professional license to practice. 7 Law, like
medicine, was to be professionalized and distinguished from the dubious "trades."8 The late 1800s edition of Blackstone's Commentaries
made the express contrast between the trade of the law-a source of
money if little else for the practitioner-and the science of its academic study. 9
The compendium of cases confronting the uneducated lawyer
was chaotic.' 0 Thus, the "scientifical" Blackstone came to the rescue:
aspiring lawyers, who might otherwise be trained only "at the desk of
some skillful attorney [in the] mechanical parts of the business,"'"
might instead study the material as a science. Blackstone was an admirer of Henry Finch's 1625 Law or a Discourse Thereofand regarded it

as having shown how to reduce the chaos of cases to "a regular methodological science."' 2 Blackstone thus announced the transformation
13
of legal education from apprenticeship to the academic process.
Where vulgar trades were learned in guilds and, quite literally, in the
streets, sciences by contrast were to be taught in the robed, serene,
and hallowed halls of academe.
Dean Langdell later reported that when he arrived at the law
school in 1870,
5. Mark Bartholomew, Legal Separation: The Relationship Between the Law School and the
Central University in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53J. LEGAL EDUC. 368, 369 (2003).
6. Address by Dean Langdell, Harvard University "Quarter-Millennial" Celebration
(Nov. 5, 1887), reprinted in 3 LAw Q. REv. 123, 124 (1887); Alfred S. Konefsky &John Henry
Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REv. 833,
843 (1981-82) [hereinafter Mirror].
7. Mirror, supra note 6, at 843.
8. See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 379.
9. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, Preface at xxviii (internal citation omitted).
10. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, Preface at vi, xxx.
11. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 29.
12. Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 103, 105 (2003) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, An Analysis of the Laws of England,
in TRACTS, CHIEFLY RELATING TO THE ANTIQUITIES AND LAWS OF ENGLAND V (3d ed. Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1771) (1762)).
13. Id. at 107.
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it was indispensable to establish at least two things-that law is a
science, and that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books.... [T]he library is the proper workshop
of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural4 history is to the zoologists, the botanical garden to
the botanists. 1
To Dean Langdell and his colleagues at the turn of the nineteenth century, the study of the law was a scientific, book-based endeavor. Law was made science by suggesting that its principles were
discoverable-much as physical laws were discoverable-and that the
great segments of law might, as Linnaeus mapped the species, be arranged into natural hierarchies. "Natural" law, cited after all in the
Declaration of Independence, endorsed the one true, abstract law.
This was a science consisting of "certain principles and doctrines" by
which decisions of judges could be measured. 15 After all, from the
seventeenth century on-without much pause-the physical sciences
had brought forth astonishing fruit as a direct result of their principled organization of concepts, theories, and modes of enquiry. Universities had since modeled themselves on those structures. This
success had a pronounced effect on the social "sciences" and informed their creation and investigation. 16 So too the law schools, hitherto stepchildren in the university setting, aspired to full membership
and the associated prestige of scientific success.

II.

The Professor

After the American Revolution, Tapping Reeve, a practicing lawyer, began what was likely the first formal approach to teaching law in
the United States. He gathered students in his parlor in Litchfield,
Connecticut, and, by 1784, had built a special room next to his house
to take in additional students. 17 Instruction at the Litchfield Law
School included both lectures on principles of law and moot court.18
14. Langdell, supra note 6, at 124. See generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 225 (1992).
15. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12, 13, 18, 59 (1974). Justice
Benjamin N. Cardozo alludes to this in BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI77, 77-78 (1921) (noting the nineteenth-century belief that there was "an
exact rule for every case to be reached by an absolute process of logical deduction") (quoting Roscoe Pound,JuristicScience and The Law, 31 HARV. L. REv. 1047, 1048 (1918)). See aLso
Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Ideals On Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 2, 13 (1933).
CIAL PROCESS

16.

See

HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL

554 (1949).

17. Litchfield Historical Society, A History of the Litchfield Law School, http://
www.litchfieldhistoricalsociety.org/history/histlawschool.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
18. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

In the next century, the emphasis for instructors moved from expertise in the practice of law to academic expertise. "What qualifies a
person . . . to teach law, is not experience in the work of a lawyer's
office . . . but experience in learning law."1 9 And so professors were

hired not for career success but for their academic promise. Before
1865, there was "no strictly academic legal professional." 20 But by the
1870s and into the 1880s, legal training-and legal associations such
as the American Bar Association-had expressly disengaged from the
"baseness of everyday law practice" 21 to adopt the prestige and constriction of the profession to those who could afford three years of
school taught by fulltime professors without much of a notion of the
courtroom. The process was well under way in the 1940s with the evisceration of most alternative forms of legal training, such as unaccredited law schools, night and part-time schools, and clerkships with
lawyers. Ultimately, by the 1970s, law office apprenticeships were
22
largely abolished.
III.

The Academic Text

As with the prestigious liberal arts college professors they so
dearly desired to emulate, law professors researched, wrote, and published. The one hundred years after the 1870s saw a revolution of discourse in the legal profession. The balance of studied texts shifted
from judges' opinions and commentaries that summarized those opinions to include the writing of academia. This academic discourse was
often in the form of law review articles written by professors with little
practical experience and edited by law students with no experience at
all. 23 Where in England the common law analytic continued its focus

on the practical review of judges' opinions, in the United States a
more formal academic text supervened. "[T]he English [legal]
teacher emphasizes what the judge has said; the American [legal] pro19. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL:
(1978) (quoting Dean Langdell).
20. Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 384.
21.

THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

37

Id. at 386 (quoting MORTON HORWITZ, ESSAYS ON SIMON E. BALDWIN 23 (Charles C.

Goetsch ed., Hartford 1981)).
22.
23.

Shreve, supra note 3, at 603; see STEVENS, supra note 2, at 205.
Law Journals: Submissions and Rankings, http://lawlib.w/u/LJ/index.aspx (last
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fessor explains what the judge should have said." 24 The American Legal Institute's Restatements, too, were developed to help make sense of
the deluge of opinions swamping the United States courts in the first
quarter of the twentieth century (a deluge which has only increased
since).25 The Restatements provided a "concise statement of the principles of law as enunciated in thousands of cases ....-26 With so many
opinions to choose from, however, the "re-staters" became "creators"
of the law, increasingly cited by appellate opinions rather than the
other way around. And academia went beyond the scientific discernment of the law from cases to discernment ex cathedra, as it were. At
least one now central area of law-contracts-was, in great part, the
invention of a law professor who went on to join the United States
27
Supreme Court.
IV.

The Great Divide

There is almost the taint of original sin in this portrait of practical
lawyering, juxtaposed with the pure science of a law school professor.
This helps explain the ambiguous relationship between law schools
and the practice of law, between the black-robed authors of abstract
multifactor legal tests and the lawyers trying cases. This idea of a taint
puts some perspective on the clinical professors' second-class citizenship in their law schools. And, this makes some sense of the less-thanuseful first year associate: law school simply does not train for practice.
The contrast of a noble "science" with practical lawyering points to the
role the profession has had in its own slander, and the perpetuation of
the imprudent, but popular, disreputable portrait of trial lawyers.
24. STEVENS, supra note 2, at 133 (quoting Arthur Goodhart, "an American who became professor of jurisprudence at Oxford in 1930").
25. See id. at 131-33.
26. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Influences of the American Law Institute's ProposedRestatement
of the Law GoverningLawyers, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY STUDIES (2001),
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/
professionalresponsibility/pp010201.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
27. The professor was Oliver Wendell Holmes. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 6, 18,
20-21. See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE LJ. 541, 549 (2003) (noting that "this classical model owed more to
Holmes's imagination than to a careful reading of case law"). I have not, myself, sorted the
irony of the positivisticJustice Holmes, who gave us the epigrammatic "this body of dogma
or systematized prediction which we call the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 61, 458 (1897). In contrast, Professor Holmes divined the law of
contracts without much regard to the decided cases. Others have noted the "mystery" of
the relationship between Holmes's pragmatic judging and his debt to philosophy. See, e.g.,
RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58-59 (2003).
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Learning Law

The Blackstone Commentariesapproach was one in which the principles of law were surgically extracted, and so defined, from selected
cases. This approach later gave way to the casebook method. While
the useful taxonomies of the Commentaries, reincarnated in the Restatements and later still in state compendia, such as the work of Bernard
Witkin,28 became a staple of the practicing lawyer's diet, the association between these commentators and their academic cousins never
weakened. My colleagues and I studied law as it was made; we read
Marbuy v. Madison29 on the role of the Supreme Court and judicial
review, Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Company"° on torts, and, of
course, Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines3 ' (recall the noble mudguards case
exploring the scope of the Dormant Commerce Clause). These cases
were taught as examples of law erupting, like the shockwave of an
expanding nova. We followed the unprecedented development within
the conflict between law and technology, among developing social or
economic structures, and of an older-or sometimes newer (Brown v.
Bd. of Education32 and perhaps Roe v. Wad13-)-legal regime. This was
a law that always developed and progressed, aside from deviations and
blots upon the evolution 3 4 which, by its very exception, established the
predominant movement.
But behind the advancing shockwave appears the time-consuming, mundane, and less tumultuous sorting out of accepted law and its
application to specific cases. Later, there is the routine application to
familiar facts, until the doctrine is so sufficiently woven into the fabric
of our assumptions that it is not questioned, is not litigated, and is not
the staple of our work. The difference, then, between the path of
academe and that of the practicing lawyer and judge is captured by
the metaphor of this ever-moving shockwave: law schools focus on history-making Supreme Court opinions, commentators, and law review
articles examining legal developments-the "science" (as Dean Langdell might have said) being the evolving taxonomy of doctrine. Perhaps it is not so much science as the history of the science. It is as if
28.

See, e.g., BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (10th ed. 2005).

29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
31. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) come to mind here.
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doctors learned about the cardiovascular system by studying William
Harvey or aspiring astronomers only by reading Newton.
This legal science has little apparent regard for the practical work
of a lawyer, which is focused on using the mundane law-in any guise,
any doctrine, however categorized-to solve a practical personal or
business problem. Lawyers and judges care about facts; doctrine is a
means to tell a story, to dress it for consumption by the legal machine.
At the practical level, advocates assert wildly inconsistent affirmative
defenses and claims to see which might settle best with the facts as
they develop. Where an appellate court might be accused of fudging
the facts in the interest of a coherent opinion, trial lawyers may be
accused of ignoring the niceties of legal doctrine, including raw relevance, to highlight-or blot out-an engaging fact.

VI.

Empirical Law

To be sure, the old "science" of law in the form of compendia is,
in fact, a daily resource: now we do use the Restatements and Witkin's
summaries, but we are as far from the academy as we ever were. Lawyers read law review articles and Supreme Court opinions rarely and
not for their doctrinal nicety, but when they need to because they
provide the strongest package for their facts. Once in the profession,
and not before, the lawyer finally learns the trade.
Science versus the practical arts: but this is, after all, a false division based on an antiquated "natural law" view of the material. The
profession did, once, think of law as a science-a platonic realm of
discoverable principles, a "sort of mystical absolute."3 5 The discovery
of hidden law from its evidence-i.e., court cases-is what Justice
Story perhaps thought "law" meant in Swift v. Tyson.36 But then Brandeis and Holmes, as Swift was overruled in Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins, 3 7 stated the contrary: the "law" is as judges implement it, the
practical prediction of the mundane operation of the courts. 38 Few
today believe the law exists as a sort of platonic realm, discoverable via
scientific investigation, hypothesis, and testing, separate from the daily
grist of its application.
35. GILMORE, supra note 15, at 107.
36. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
37. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (objecting to the fallacy of a "transcendental body of law").
38. Holmes, supra note 27. Justice Cardozo calls this the "catastrophic" experience of
litigation. CARDOZO, supra note 15, at 128.
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Yet a powerful academic rhetoric remains, and in its discrimination against the practice of law, it continues to produce lawyers incapable of lawyering. Judge Posner, who also teaches at the University of
Chicago Law School, still notes the "formalist" structure in which "law
39
students want to think they're being initiated into a deep mystery"
and writes, "law could do with some demystification. '' 40 Many of our
law school classes are taught by professors whose only courtroom experience was to watch the judges for whom they clerked-and that
usually at the appellate level. Really, this is odd. It is peculiar that contracts would be taught by a professor who has never negotiated or
litigated a contract. Or that torts could be taught by someone with no
experience litigating a mass tort action or with no first-hand experience in a personal injury contingency case. Of course, there are a host
of courses with enormous historical importance and essential to a lawyer's understanding of the legal system-courses that do not lend
themselves to a "practical" approach. But surely the default ought to
be the contrary of what it is now, which is to disparage the trade and
assume a dubious worth of the "clinical" approach.
And those writing tomes, treaties, and commentaries ought to
have a sense of the consequences of theory. I mean, that is, the real
consequences: in courts, boardrooms, and offices of legal services, as
humans try to negotiate deals with each other and settle disputes
within their family. There are consequences, serious ones. The adoption of abstract, impractical tests, whether originally located in the Restatements or law review articles, causes loss of predictability and great
41
expense in the trial courts.

Indeed, the shockwave of legal development and the hard work
of case-by-case implementation are of a piece. And the trial judge addresses the twin aspects. The judge is beset, on the one side, by academic tomes of the Restatement, law reviews, and appellate opinions
with nine-part balancing tests where each factor must be evaluated for
its position on some spectrum. On the other side, the court manages
discovery, settlements, case management, routine trial rulings, and
limits on testimony. Here, judgment and experience, and not doc39. POSNER, supra note 27, at 63.
40. Id. at 73.
41. See, e.g., James F. Byrne Jr., Reevaluation of the Restatement as a Source of Law in Arizona, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 1021, 1021 n.4 (1973) (discussing how Arizona has adopted the
Restatementswhen not inconsistent with other Arizona law). I have previously written on the
costs of abstract multifactor tests. Curtis E. A. Karnow, Paying the Price of the Burden ofProof
RECORDER, Oct. 31, 1991, at 6, 9. See, e.g., Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999).
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trine, rule the day. Those who deal with rapidly mutating and shifting
technologies, data, and interests are acutely aware of the limited role
of abstract doctrine, even when it comes to what appear to be classic
contract issues. By the time the law is "discovered" and generally accepted, much of the world will have long passed it by. Clients have no
interest or use for the lengthy legal analysis of cases. There is usually
little use in attempting to compare the doctrine among circuits' or
states' doctrine, for often there is none. As Judge Wyzanski said of the
Sherman Act, 42 "it is delusive to treat opinions written by different

judges at different times as pieces of ajig-saw puzzle which can be, by
effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern.

43

The New Teaching as of Old

VII.

Successful legal education must, in addition to the introduction
to doctrine and its history, present the practice of law in its true context. That context is not the law school. It is the world of business,
families, prisons, trial courts, and communities. Until lawyers can exercise their legal judgment in those contexts, they are not fitted for
the practice of law. During the "dot-coin" boom, we saw a number of
law schools (as well as business schools) introduce new departments,
courses, and clinics devoted to rapidly emerging technology and intellectual property law issues. By necessity, the instruction was practical,
that is, focused on responses in the absence of decisive, established
doctrine. Some of these courses and clinics remain, tightly knitting a
study of old opinions and new trial court cases. These are examples
for practical training. Below, I make three suggestions for how a legal
education may better prepare students for the practice of law.
A.

The Courses
First, the courses. These must be treated with an importance

equal to contracts, torts, secured transactions, tax, and the like. That
is, these should not be "pass/fail"; some must be required, and they
should be taught by professors on tenure track or with tenure. The
courses will train and test students in the application of the law, including (under supervision) in courts, at negotiating tables, and for
advising clients. The courses will emphasize judgment, practicality,
and utilizing the law within reasonable bounds to advance the interests of the clients. The work will include advocacy, mediation, negotia42.
43.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-12 (2000).
United States v.United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953).
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tion skills, and written memoranda. These courses will not be electives
or relegated to the extracurricular joys of moot court: development of
these skills is mandatory. A model here includes clinical work in the
second and third year, coupled with internships either in a fourth
year, over summers, or some other period.
B.

The Teachers

Second, the teachers. It is not enough to have clerked for the
Supreme Court, except, perhaps, for a course on appellate procedure
and the workings of the Court. But for those courses outlined above,
only those with experience in the area are competent. The usual qualifications-prestigious clerkships, law review, publications, and suchwill always be desirable, but these must not act as sole qualifications. If
law schools hire teachers who have both (1) the scholarship and raw
intelligence we associate with our best professors, as well as (2) the
experience in law practice, then the marked distinction between the
"part time" practitioner and the full-time tenured professor will dissolve. The teachers here would not be relegated to beyond the pale of
"clinical" courses; their expertise would be used to instruct in the skills
I outline above in the context of the classic courses, such as contracts,
tax, real property, torts, and so on.
C.

The Community

Third, the community. As a function of the two suggestions
above, law schools would be increasingly integrated into the communities that surround them, that is, the legal communities ofjudges and
lawyers, as well as the social community, which would provide the reality check law students need and utilize the help law students can provide. Just as a lawyer without a client is an oxymoron, so a law school
isolated from the community may be tangled in the pursuit of theory
unmoored from its rationale.
VIII.

A Caveat in Conclusion

My emphasis on the practical can be misunderstood; I do not suggest law schools teach mechanical skills or provide vocational training.
I do not exclude the need for intellectual rigor and excellence in analytical thinking and writing. These remain essential abilities of any
good lawyer. Mastery of legal history and the development of doctrines, the ability to analyze and intertwine complex facts and complex
legal principles-the intellectual, or academic pursuit, as it were-is
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truly inextricably linked with the development of the practical judgment we expect from the best lawyers and judges. The rhetoric of
academe, and its concomitant authoritative instruction, acts (as any
language can) as a binding element, bonding judges and lawyers over
time and attaching the legal community to those it serves and those
who support it. For ifjudges do not have such a common ground, the
law cannot act as the binding element for the larger society, nor can
judges decide the cases in the interstices of settled law, which is, after
all, where they spend most of their time.
Law may be a practical thing, manifested only in what courts do
in fact, 4 4 but there must be a tethering of that practical discretion.
The tether is the teaching succored by the academy. This is instruction as authoritative teaching, 45 as if the law were an objective story,
ramifying throughout its history and enfolding its students-just as
they are sent out into the world-in the cold, sparkling comfort of
doctrine and its abiding language.

44. CARDOZO, supranote 15, at 126; Holmes, supra note 27, at 457. A wonderful book,
by one of Cardozo and Holmes's progeny, is Richard Posner's Cardozo: A Study in Reputation. See RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (Univ. of Chi. Press 1990).
Posner is a good example of the teacher I have in mind: he is Chief Judge of the Seventh
Circuit, teaches at the University of Chicago Law School, and writes. A lot.
45. See PHILIP RIEFF, FELLOW TEACHERS (1975) (Professor Reiff-one of my teachershere announces his jeremiad, emphasizing the authoritative implementation of the past as
essential to morally powerful teaching).
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